Download
AV clips
 
Home Page > History > Evil of the great spleen

Historical and Geographical Outline
Ivo Rendic Miocevic

 

Medieval Bosnia shared many characteristics with other South-Slavic states of the period. That political domain (not a state!) was established as a military commonwealth and functioned as a patriarchal family. Historian Nada Klaic makes a connection between the creation of the Bosnian political domain and the dominion of the Avars where the term "Ban" (used by Croatian and Bosnian leaders) originated. The Bosnian lands, having been politically organized along the same lines as the other South Slav countries, from the outset enjoyed independence which was to last for another 400 years.1

The core of the old Bosnian state (see map 19) was geographically nested within regions that the Bosnian core gradually annexed. The river Drina separates the Bosnian core from Serbia, and the Serbian king Nemanja's state never crossed the river, but rather directed its expansionary efforts at the Zahumlje region (maps 4 and 5). Eventually, after many changes of fortune, Zahumlje was incorporated into the Bosnian state, and on the eve of the Ottoman occupation, that was a region under the control of Herceg (Duke) Stjepan Vukcic. This region eventually assumed the name of Hercegovina, but the name Dalmatia is evident on most older maps. Hercegovina was a subordinated and a less common term. On some maps, this region is termed Turkish Dalmatia.1a

Regions north, west and south of the historical core naturally gravitated towards Croatia, and the medieval histories of Croatia and Bosnia are intertwined. Bosnia expanded territorially onto historical Croat regions (compare map 19 with map 11),


Map 19
The growth of Bosnia
(T. Macan "Povijest hrvatskog naroda")

 


Map 11
The growth of Bosnia towards Croatian historical lands


and King Tvrtko (1353-1391) ruled over regions east of Drina. After Tvrtko's passing, Bosnian aristocrats each ruled over specific regions, including historical Croatian regions (map 20).


Map 20
The territories of Bosnian lords in the 15th century
(F. Sisic "Povijest Hrvata u vrijeme narodnih vladara")


By the end of the 16th Century, the Ottomans formed one Pashaluk (a military territorial
unit), encompassing the Bosnian kingdom and other regions won from Croatia (Sanjaks/provinces Pakrac, Bihac, Klis and Hercegovina). The Croatian historical regions on the western part of the Pashaluk were called "Turkish Croatia" on many older maps. Sanjaks Pozega and Srijem were outside the Bosnian Pashaluk, and these were collectively called Turkish Slavonia. Due to turbulent historical circumstances, a large part of Croatia's historical territories is now a part of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Old maps clearly show that the border between the Ottoman Bosnia and Serbia is the river Drina.


The uniqueness of Bosnia

Since there were no adherents of the Orthodox faith in Bosnia before the arrival of the Ottomans, it can be concluded that the direct descendants of the indigenous population are today's Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims. One of the facts that proves this is the use of the "ikavica" sub-dialect by both national groups. In the old Bosnian state, court, aristocracy and the commoners in addition to "ikavica" used some other terms, specific to Croats.6 Ancient Croatian Slavic names for months of the year are a good example (sicanj, veljaca etc.). The dialect used in Bosnia before the Ottoman conquest confirms that Bosnia was inhabited by compact population using a western version of the "stokavski" dialect which is a lot closer to the "cakavski" and "stokavski" than to the eastern "stokavski" dialect (map 4). Using archeological, anthropological and linguistic criteria we can conclude that today's Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims belonged to the same medieval ethnicity, from which throughout the centuries two modern nations have been forged through the crucible of frequently conflicting religious, political, cultural and societal identities and loyalties. To conclude that Croats and Bosniaks-Muslims have the same roots does not mean that the latter are Croats. The process of separation took a long time, and started at a time when there were no nations in the modern sense of that word in the region. Not even the fact that specifically Croat terms7 were used for Bosniaks-Muslims, their language and land during the Ottoman times can't be used as a convincing argument to consider them as an integral part of Croatian nation "led astray" by deceptions and ironies of history. A sense of "belonging" to a modern nation is a matter of free choice which has passed through various mutations in the course of alternated historical circumstances. The creation of separate Croat and Muslim nations, with a major role played by religion, is a good example how nations came into existence in this region. We will later analyze how Muslims came to exist in Bosnia through the process of the conversion of the indigenous population to Islam. It is a fact that many Catholics converted to the new religion, which also proves that Bosniaks-Muslims emerged out of the same ethnic substratum from which the modern Croat nation was created.

The entire region developed into the dominion ruled by a network of families, which laid the foundation for the further development. The Bosnian aristocracy tried to keep their independence and uniqueness, with the unhappy consequence of parochialism as the
governing principle, which eventually led even to the voluntary submission and acceptance of the conquering Ottoman despotic rule in order to preserve certain benefits and elements of power.


The ethnic character of Bosnia

Arguments about the early Serb character of Bosnia are quite weak and very easy to dispel. Annales regni Francorum describe the rebellion of Croatian war-lord Ljudevit Posavski and mention that an army was sent against him in 822. "Ljudevit leaves Sisak and flees to the Serbs, people inhabiting a large part of Dalmatia." It was already pointed out that nations of the 19th and 20th centuries can't be mechanically equalled to those in the early centuries after the arrival of Croats and Serbs (although the stages and detours of the "birth of a nation" are still debated among scholars) . These nations were neither fully formed nor defined in those days and the casual mention of some ethnic-ringing name can't be considered as proof that a certain region did or did not belong to the Croats or Serbs (even in the medieval sense of the word).

As far as the "flees to the Serbs" part is concerned, according to N. Klaic, those Serbs are analogous with a medieval aristocratic county in the 14th Century (today's town of "Srb" in the Republic of Croatia). Even linguistically, this has nothing to do with Serbian people: Srb is a small village near the spring of the river Una (north of Knin in Croatia). Serbian linguists see this name as a trace of the Serbian name (Serb->Srb?). However, according to academician Petar Simunovic the name of Srb originates from an old Croatian verb serbati, srebati = to sip, from which the noun "srb" has been derived. Thus "srb" denotes the spring of river Una, where the village lies. Similarly, there are villages of Srbani (near Pula), and Srbinjak, both in Istria (historically never populated by ethnic Serbs), which clearly have nothing to do with the Serbian name. The "Istarski Razvod"/Istrian manuscript from 13th century mentions the name of srbar, meaning a water spring.

The citation in the "Annales" is often used as a proof that Bosnia was under Serb control, but this combination, according to N. Klaic, is not only wishful thinking, but should be completely dismissed.12

Byzantine emperor-turned-historian Constantine Porfirogenet included the towns of Kotor and Desnik as a part of "small land of Bosnia". An unreliable author (deeply involved in rewriting the history as a quasi-ideological weapon in the contemporary Byzantine territorial disputes) cannot be seriously accepted as the crucial witness of the far reaching (but shaky, hanging onto a dubious sentence) argument about the supposed Serb character of Bosnia. He indicated that he counts Bosnia as a Serb land, or, to be exact, under Serb political rule.13 But this whole argument is based on Porfirogenet's data that defines the Serb territories extending as far as the river Cetina (deep inside today's Republic of Croatia)-which sinks the "argument" instantly, due to the multitude of other historical chronicles which are unanimous re the territorial compass of early Croat historical lands. In fact, these "truths", all set in advance, distorted and misused by modern Serb nationalism - a combination that is very dangerous at specific times because it calls for the "defence of ancient territories". Serbian version of history is polluted with such "truths", but Croats also aren't immune to myopic visions of history.

Such shaky argumentation about "Serbian Bosnia" was not infrequently combined with the pseudoscholium on the supposedly Orthodox character of the "Bosnian church".14 Even that attempt, as far as scholars are concerned, has miserably failed. Arguments that base the Serbian character of Bosnia on Tvrtko's family relations to the Nemanjic dynasty through his grandmother Jelisaveta, are, from an academic standpoint, a ridiculous example of pathetic hysteriography.

The whole Bosnian region, with the surrounding Croatian lands, was without any doubt, Catholic and "Krstjan" (Bosnian "Heretic") before the Ottoman conquest. It is a fact that the whole region was under the jurisdiction of several Catholic dioceses.


Map 22
The territorial oganisation of churches in Croatia and Bosnia
(N. Klaic "Povijest Hrvata u razvijenom srednjem vijeku")


The Catholic Church's jurisdiction doesn't mean the complete victory of Christianity, because across the entire region some Pagan beliefs survived. That occurrence was characteristic for Western Europe as well, where in certain regions Christianity achieved total victory only after a lengthy delay. It is clear that all necessary conditions were in place for evolution into a modern Croat nation, as a projected symbiosis, with Catholicism as a powerful unifying force.

The Croat character of Bosnia is sometimes argued along the following lines: Croat rulers reigned, intermittently, over much of medieval Bosnia. But-successful military operations of Croat kings and Serb dukes did not translate into permanent political rule and annexation of territories being fought over.15 The Croatian character of Bosnia cannot be definitely proven by the illustrious title "Rex Ramae" used by the Hungarian-Croat Arpadovic dynasty nor by attempting to portray the Bosnian aristocracy as being predominantly Croatian in manners and political affiliation. The term "Ban" is certainly Croatian in nature, but not even this can be proof that Bosnia belonged to Croatia. Yes, the rulers of Bosnia called themselves "Ban", but that doesn't have to mean that Bosnia was Croatian; rather, Croatian and Bosnian histories have been interlinked throughout the centuries. Precisely because of this closeness, similar styles of ruling systems developed - more specifically, aristocratic dynasties.

Before the Ottoman invasion, the link between Croatia and Bosnia was most evident in Church organization. This whole region was under the jurisdiction of various Catholic dioceses (map 22). The Bosnian "heretic" church owes its existence to the spread of Gnostic Pataren influences from the west via Zadar and Split that reached the interior of Bosnia and Hum (a period term for Hercegovina). The process of integration of the peoples and regions within a Catholic Croatian framework was abruptly ended by the Ottomans, who actively engaged in spreading Islam and, as a side-effect, Orthodoxy (map 3).

Bosnia developed as a separate state that existed until 1463. Finally, as a result of the Ottoman invasion, it became a Pashaluk. However, when medieval Bosnia is discussed today, and the rights of the indigenous Bosniak-Muslims in it (which is justified), an important fact is often (deliberately) left unmentioned. That essential piece of information is that the Bosnian Pashaluk spread into Croatian territories (map 21). The Christian counter-offensives in the 17th century reduced the territory of the Pashaluk, but even so, large tracts of Croatian lands remained in it, and within today's Bosnia and Hercegovina. Current eastern borders of Croatia are military borders, established through peace agreements, while the historic Croat territories stretching towards rivers Vrbas and Bosna in the central Bosnia and parts of Montenegro were irrecoverably lost.19 It needs to be pointed out that undoubtedly Croatian historical lands, such as "Turkish Croatia" (now, the northwestern third of the contemporary sovereign Bosnia and Hercegovina), are today completely inhabited by a non-Croatian population. Ignoring, and deliberately disregarding (or, sometimes, consciously distorting/obscuring) these facts, whilst discussing the historical uniqueness and independence of Bosnia, takes on exclusivist/nationalist connotations, this time Bosniak-Muslim. The importance of open-minded discussion of the controversial issues weighting heavily on the national consciousnesses of all the parties involved cannot be overemphasized. Extremism, exclusivist claims or vocal silence are indubitable signposts on the road to the Bosnia's final doom.


The Ottomans and Islam

The Ottoman invasion was unleashed towards Bosnia, but Bosnian aristocrats at the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century, such as Hrvoje Vukcic Hrvatinic and Stjepan Kosaca, were almost solely preoccupied with their parochial power games and preservation of influence spheres. The logical corollary of such an attitude was their willingness to side with those that could offer them a power sharing arrangement, and ensure rule over their "cantons". The aristocrats's ideology was a natural concommitant of an age of violence, and as such, their fight for "cantonisation" was merciless32 (see map 20 and pictures 31 and 32). One cannot overlook a striking resemblance to the current fight for the creation of national republics and autonomous provinces. The Ottomans were received by the nobility as a welcomed ally in the effort to consolidate the newfound power. Hrvoje Vukcic Hrvatinic wooed the Ottomans for help in his war against Sigismund of Luxembourg, a long time before the fall of Bosnia.

It is a historical truth that the Ottoman assault, assisted by islamised Bosnians, almost biologically destroyed the Croat nation. Some Bosnian Muslim historians maintain that the adherents of the "Bosnian church" converted to Islam, but the reality isn't so simple. Bosniak-Muslim scholar Hadzijahic avers that it is mostly the lower classes, peasants37 that converted to Islam, whilst the tribal organization of the cattle grazers was a barrier to the process. Croat historian Muzic rejects the hypothesis that Bosnian "heretics" converted to Islam en masse, because there were so few of them at the time-hence, no "masse" was available. He instead puts forward a speculation that it was the indigenous Pagans38 who converted, which is highly improbable due to the fact that Bosnia was already a Christianized country (and, not surprisingly, corroborated by early Ottoman population census ). Catholic writer Krunoslav Draganovic points out that Catholics were also converts to Islam39, and according to eminent Bosnian Croat historian, voluminous Franciscan author Dominik Mandic, the conversion of Catholics to Islam was particularly noticeable in times of increased persecution of Catholics, especially during the 17th century violent oppression, which can justifiably be labelled as the era of pogroms over Catholics. Despite all the doubts, it is clear that Bosniak-Muslims are in majority of cases the descendants of the indigenous population (although we shouldn't overlook the influx of outsiders from other parts of the empire, in relation to both the initial invasion, and the latter withdrawal of sizeable Muslim populations from liberated parts of Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and so on).

In the Bosnian Pashaluk, the Catholic population was treated as a particularly treacherous
denomination because their leader was the Pope - the arch-enemy of the Ottomans. With the adherents of the Orthodox faith (virtually non-existent in Bosnia proper on the eve of its fall), things were utterly different. Only two Orthodox sacral objects were registered in Bosnia in the 15th century, one near Visegrad on the Drina river, and the other in Milesevo.40 Map 23 shows the locations of churches in Bosnia at the time of the Ottoman arrival.


Map 23
Locations of churches in Bosnia before the arrival of the Ottomans
(S. Cirkovic "Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske drzave")


Musing over conspicuous absence of the Orthodox churches and monasteries, historian Ciro Truhelka remarked:

"In the region between Drina, Neretva and the Adriatic Sea and to the north to the river Sava, in the medieval times, there is absolutely no indication of existence of any Orthodox church or monastery. Only on the other side of the Neretva river, in the land of Hum (Hercegovina), which for a time was under Serb sovereignty, existed a church in Trebinje and a monastery at Ston. This last one was secularized after Dubrovnik purchased Ston and Rat in 1333, and the monks left for Jerusalem. The first Orthodox churches and monasteries only began to be built in the second half of the 16th Century. That is when a host of monasteries were built in eastern Bosnia: Tavna (Tamna), Ozren (1577), Papraca and Lomnica (1597), all in the same era and built by the same builders".42

As the Serbian Orthodox Church spread its influence as a part of the Ottoman state apparatus, the Croatian Catholics were able to seek refuge within the Orthodox faith. That is why many Catholics (especially in eastern Bosnia and Hercegovina) converted to Orthodox Christianity.43As a result of the Ottoman invasion, large Croat populations fled, and their land was settled by Orthodox Wallachians as loyal subjects of the Ottoman empire. The sturdy cattle grazers, but some of them also farmers, they were granted land for their service in the Ottoman army. The Ottoman onslaught changed the demographic structure of Bosnia: those Catholics that converted to the Orthodox faith, as well as Orthodox Wallachian settlers, eventually, through the assimilative sociocultural activities of the Serbian Orthodox church, have become a part of the Serb nation.44 A change in Bosnian dialects is also a byproduct of the demographic changes (see maps 4a, b, and c). With the settlement of the Wallachians and their eastern-hercegovinian dialect the compact region of western stokavian dialect was broken up. The widespread use of the new dialect is easily observed in majority Serb areas. Even the dialects chart of the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman times thus shows that Orthodoxy came to Bosnia as a result of the Ottoman conquest. The intrusion of the new dialect and Orthodoxy into Bosnia continued towards the Croatia proper regions where sudden demographic changes took place, which is supported by the decline of the old Croatian "cakavian" sub-dialect. (map 3, maps 4a, b and c). We can thus agree that sophisticated analyses of demographic movements and dialects before and after the arrival of the Ottomans definitely puts the theory of the Serb character of medieval Bosnia to rest.



The road to the Bosniak nation

Up until the 19th century, historical sources claim that Bosniaks of all three faiths (Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims) live in Bosnia. That identity was not brought into question by the Turkish authorities, nor by the Bosniaks themselves.50After the Serb rebellions, a process whereby the Orthodox Bosniaks became a part of the Serb nation began, helped along by religious and state propaganda. Bosniak-Muslim scholar Z. Hadzidedic points out that the nationalization of the Bosnian Orthodox has full legitimacy because nation is a political and sociocultural category.51As far as the nationalization of the Bosnian Catholics is concerned, Hadzidedic believes that it was only completed in the 1940's, and that it was a reaction to the growing nationalism of the newly nationalized Orthodox adherents.52 Complex issues surrounding the creation of the Bosniak nation, definitely completed in a bloody divorce, cannot be fully understood if we don't know the opinions of Bosnian Muslim historians. Of course, the opinions of these authors need to be critically analyzed, because they only now have the opportunity to create and define the focal points of their national identity. Even if we respect their opinions, we need to acknowledge the possibility that their approach could take on the characteristics of national romanticism, like the Croat and Serb history had in the last century.

A Catholic-Orthodox-Muslim Bosnian nation could never have been idyllic. In the Bosnian Pashaluk, the Ottomans infused the indigenous islamised population with the idea of statehood (Turkish-Oriental variant) and helped shape a new, fiercely loyal ethnicity, which is a unique case in all the European lands under their occupation. Christian populations always harboured fears of dominant Islam, and the fact that some Franciscans wholeheartedly embraced the idea of the Bosniak nation remained a historical oddity. Fears of religious communities increased at the time of the Ottoman withdrawal. Islam, which previously threatened Croatia's existence in particular, was now on the defensive on all fronts and could not expect any mercy from the Christians. The Ottoman Empire came under attack from Christians whose minds were full of grim memories (real and imagined) of islamic yoke. Inside the Empire, in the Bosnian Pashaluk, a socio-religious rebellion against the Turks, ie. Bosnian Muslims was an expected byproduct. An ecumenical Bosniak nation could not have been anything but a stillbirth.

By accepting Islam, the Bosniaks entered a new culture and gained Sultan's protection, but on the other hand accepted a great risk, a risk which they were not aware of at the time. That risk consists of living surrounded by unrelenting enemies, and those enemies are neighbours of another denomination who could not accept the Muslim ascendancy, nor forget what it entailed. The risk was that our "Turks" frequently got punished for everything the Ottomans had (or hadn't) done in these regions.



Fear rules over Bosnia

Croats (and Serbs) remember many cruel and demeaning acts perpetrated by the Muslims, who acted as the protected privileged caste. These include many pogroms and murders of Franciscans, as well as the sale of Croats into slavery.57 As the decline of the Ottoman Empire set in, at the end of the 16th century, the Orthodox population came under increased attacks, and Sinan-Pasha in 1594. burned the bones of the Serbian Saint Sava. Acts like these gave impetus to collective revenge, or externalization of the aggression. The weakening of the Ottomans brought great fear and uncertainty to the Muslim population of Bosnia. In Christian offensives, the Bosnian Muslims were to pay for the sins of the Ottomans. The Christian armies acted brutally in showdowns with Islam. Sarajevo was razed to the ground in 1697.

Having come to the realization that the Ottomans could no longer provide them with adequate protection, Bosnian Muslim aristocrats rebelled in order to keep their superior status and to get autonomy (Gradascevic's movement) within the Empire. All this resulted in repressive measures against the Bosnian nobility and other prominent members of Bosnian Muslim community. The events of the 19th Century opened up the cracks in the relationship between the Bosnian Muslims and the Ottoman Empire, but also between the Bosnian Orthodox and Catholics, who kept neutral or sided with Austria-Hungary or Serbia & Montenegro61 throughout the dispute which culminated in the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878.

The bloody conflict on the eve of the 21st century is the culmination of a centuries old development (one might say, an inevitable working out of historical fatality) that was falsely considered to have ended in WW2, when in the name of Greater Serbia the Bosniak-Muslims had been objects of a genocide.63 This time around, things were "modernized". Greater Serbian aggressive policy unleashed an instrumentalized aggression (intensified chiefly via media manipulation)64 The repressed explosive compound of fear and malign aggressivity was already present (although in a subdued form) at a tribal level among the Bosnian Serbs.

It is clear that the bloody conflict at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia was a result of the clash between different historical and national aspirations/tensions that have been building up for centuries. Three national ideas, at least as memories (or powerful myths), are a historical truth. The first national ideal is that of the medieval Bosnia, which was occupied by the Ottomans in 1463. That kingdom could have been a basis for the creation of a nation comprised of the indigenous population, Croats and Bosniak-Muslims. The second national ideal or outcome relies on Croatia, since many Croatian historical regions are a part of today's Bosnia and Hercegovina. This idea was taken further by claims that Croatia extended all the way to the Drina river, but that cannot be proven. Of course, the claim that Bosniak-Muslims are "actually" Croats (without knowing it) fits neatly into this theory.

The third national ideal is based on the existence of a separate Bosnian Pashaluk, which spread from the initial core onto Croatian regions. The fourth national ideal, the Serb one, has no grounding in history, because there had never been a Serbian kingdom here that could be the foundation for a modern nation. This ideal can only be realized through brute force, ethnic cleansing and falsifying history where the most surrealist absurdity is the oft used Serb call to the Muslims - to "return to their forefathers's faith - Orthodoxy". The conflict between the above ideals, the flames of which are fanned by the Serbian state in order to create a Greater Serbia, is horrific. Geopolitically, as we have observed, Bosnia is not worth much without Croatia. Since this panoramic view of conflicts between national ideals shows that Serbs have learnt the geopolitical lesson (but have, due to overtaxing of their energies, failed to accomplish the Greater Serbia masterplan), one is left with conclusion that Croats and Bosniak-Muslims are still groping in historical wastelands.

 

   
 
Home Page | Forum | Contact | Hrvatski
2009. Developed by asker